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PREDICTION MARKETS: ANOTHER TOOL IN THE INTELLIGENCE KITBAG
For opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making.
-John Milton, Areopagitica
The United States Intelligence Community does not lack data relevant to the global war on terrorism. However, the 9/11 Commission Report 1 supports the findings of many studies that highlight the difficulty of pooling information gathered by multiple collectors and fusing it into a coherent, comprehensive analysis to be used by strategic leaders. The diverse functional areas and organizational cultures resident in the sixteen agencies that make up our Intelligence
Community underscore this challenge. 2 • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• Department of Energy (DOE)
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• Coast Guard Intelligence element
• Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
• Department of the Treasury
• Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
• Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Intelligence elements
• National Security Agency (NSA)
• National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) The specialized talent and array of technology brought to bear by each agency produces focused analysis and fine-grained comprehension of information. This distributed approach to the production of intelligence encourages robust compliance with Executive Order 12333, which directs that
The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. 3 E.O. 12333 mandates this diversity: "Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community." 4 But this document poses a dilemma because it also requires that all agencies "cooperate fully to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort." 5 Should the IC reconcile "competition" with "cooperation"?
The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the employment by al Qaeda of suicide aircraft against targets in New York and Washington in September 2001
provide two infamous examples of the failure to fuse intelligence collected by "competing" agencies into one product in time for national leaders to thwart the attacks. In October 2003, an intelligence professional candidly acknowledged that policies and cultural issues inhibit information sharing and collaboration between elements of the Intelligence Community, thereby posing the greatest challenge to true horizontal integration of analysis. 6 The 9/11 Commission Report summed up the problem thus: "The biggest impediment to all-source analysis -to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots -is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information." 7 In an attempt to circumvent this selfish human tendency, the Intelligence Community employs interagency task forces, working groups and collaborative centers -such as the FBI's What was missing in the intelligence community [to prevent the 9/11attacks], though, was any real means of aggregating not just information but also judgments. In other words, there was no mechanism to tap into the collective wisdom of National Security Agency nerds, CIA spooks, and FBI agents. There was decentralization but not aggregation, and therefore no organization. … But everything we know about cognition suggests that a small group of people, no matter how intelligent, simply will not be smarter than the larger group. And the best tool for appreciating the collective significance of the information that the intelligence community had gathered was the collective wisdom of the intelligence community. Centralization is not the answer. But aggregation is…. Diversity brings into play the private information held by each person, which may be simply their peculiar interpretation of the known factors. Diversity is especially important in smaller groups because it adds perspectives that may not be inherently present in a group drawn from a uniform population, such as an ad-hoc "tiger team" thrown together within the same office to tackle a problem. A wide range of opinions tends to eliminate the more negative aspects of group decision-making ("group-think") and offers a larger set of possible solutions or novel approaches.
Surowiecki maintains that a group of highly intelligent people is not as effective because the members' thought processes tend to resemble one another. He quotes James March, a famous organizational theorist: "The development of knowledge may depend on maintaining an influx of the naïve and the ignorant, and … competitive victory does not reliably go to the properly educated." 12 Surowiecki cautions, however, that a group of diverse but thoroughly uninformed people will not produce a collective decision that is more accurate than the opinion of one expert. A diverse group whose members have varying degrees of knowledge about a subject will, in the long run, generate better solutions than that single expert. The expert, like any human, has an ego and is prone to overestimate the probability that he is correct. 14 Decentralization allows specialists to draw on local knowledge and tends to bypass the errors inevitably present in each person's opinion. Surowiecki refers to this as tacit knowledge -that which can't be easily summarized or conveyed to others because it is specific to a particular place or job or experience. 15 The U.S. Army champions the doctrine of decentralization every day with its empowerment of junior leaders to use their tacit knowledge to make decisions that accomplish the intent of their commander as communicated to them through his mission-type orders. Successful multinational corporations practice decentralization when they empower local managers in each country to shape marketing and distribution schemes adapted to the local culture and infrastructure.
However, decentralization loses its effectiveness if tacit knowledge or unique intelligence does not migrate to the other people within a system who would benefit from it. So the fourth attribute of a "wise crowd" reinforces decentralization: an aggregation mechanism to mold all the private opinions into a collective decision. This paper will explore the viability for the U.S.
Intelligence Community of one such mechanism, called a prediction market or information market.
Surowiecki surely warrants such a consideration:
… [the collective decision's superiority] rests on a mathematical truism. If you ask a large enough group of diverse, independent people to make a prediction or estimate a probability, and then average those estimates, the errors each of them makes in coming up with an answer will cancel themselves out. Each person's guess, you might say, has two components: information and error. Subtract the error, and you're left with the information. 16 The Japanese place great cultural emphasis on working as a group. One of their proverbs captures the spirit of the "wise crowd" with the elegance of a haiku: "None of us is as smart as all of us."
Collective Intelligence via the Marketplace
Surowiecki is not the first observer of this phenomenon. The Danish philosopher Soren
Kierkegaard was commenting on religious dogma in 1846 when he recognized the tendency for a group of people to arrive at an accurate observation: "There is a view of life which holds that where the crowd is, the truth is also, that it is a need in truth itself, that it must have the crowd on its side." 17 A simple demonstration of collective intelligence was published in 1906 by the eminent British anthropologist and statistician, Francis Galton. He was passing by an English county fair when he noticed an advertisement for a contest to guess the weight of an ox. Participants were invited to write their name and estimate on a slip of paper, then the answer closest to the actual dressed weight of the beast would win a prize. The founder of differential psychology, Galton studied human abilities and attempted to correlate them to intelligence, genetics and social factors. He hoped that the guesses of these common farmers might yield insights into the ability of voters to choose the best candidate in a democratic election.
He was able to borrow the 800 or so slips of paper and discovered that the mean (or average) of all the estimates fell within one percent of the true weight of the ox. Galton offered this grudging acknowledgement that non-intellectuals could construct a useful collective opinion:
"The result seems more creditable to the trustworthiness of a democratic judgment than might have been expected." The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all. The mere fact that there is one price for any commodity -or rather that local prices are connected in a manner determined by the cost of transport, etc. -brings about the solution which (it is just conceptually possible) might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all the people involved in the process…The most significant fact about this system [price] is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. There is a growing body of literature on the use of markets to merge information from disparate sources and then represent the result as a probability. Their tirades centered on the misconception that the PAM would be a forum for traders to profit from assassinations and terrorist attacks, a ghoulish waste of public money which would produce no public benefit. DARPA canceled the project within a few days but the media posturing endured for several months. At the time of FutureMAP's demise, Net Exchange was recruiting the first cohort to begin trading using their company's proprietary market-making software; the project had expended a total of about $1 million. 36 Opposition to the "Terrorism Futures Market"
The arguments against the Policy Analysis Market fell into seven general categories, according to Robin Hanson 37 and Robert Looney. 38 It is useful to examine each one before deciding the utility of prediction markets for this task. If DoD ever refused to pay off a contract, no one would again participate in the PAM; such a refusal would defeat the purpose of the market, which is to solicit intelligence. of gambling and speculating is the degree of chance regarding the outcome -speculators risk money when they have a high level of confidence that they will be rewarded. Committee ("The Fed"). Trade prices are constrained between $0.00 and $1.00 in increments of $0.001 to reflect a probability between zero and 100%. The IEM capped accounts at $500 in order to qualify for a letter of "no regulatory action" from the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. 45 The IEM economic markets are specifically restricted to traders from academia, but the general public may participate in any of the elections markets. The latter exhibit impressive correlation between IEM predictions and actual outcomes for elections, with errors ranging between 1.37% and 3.44%. The IEM elections markets have performed about as well as, or slightly better than, the average of several national elections polls. 46 Started in 1996, the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) calls itself "the world's longest continuously operating commercial prediction market." Tens of thousands of film aficionados around the world regularly buy and sell contracts using virtual "Hollywood dollars" (no monetary value) to back their predictions of Oscar and Grammy winners, movie star popularity, and boxoffice receipts for movies. Now a unit of the financial services company Cantor Fitzgerald, HSX sells its predictions of long-term and short-term film revenues to studios and producers.
47
NewsFutures advertises itself as the leading provider of prediction markets worldwide (50,000 markets since 2000) under the slogan "Trading uncertainty for collective wisdom." It runs no-cost predictions markets to enable the public to bet on such topics as:
• Palestine is recognized by the UN as a member state on or prior to January 1, 2008
• Nouri al-Maliki will remain Prime Minister of Iraq through the rest of Bush's presidency
• The U.S. will catch Osama bin Laden while Bush is president
• Islamic terrorists will attack in the U.S. before attacking within the European Union
• Islamic terrorists will hit the U.S. homeland again while Bush is president. 48 NewsFutures also designs and operates prediction markets for corporate clients to help them gain insight into sales and strategic commodity price forecasting, new product development, dates of project completions, business intelligence, and industry trend-spotting. Track the results of these contracts. 
Conclusion
Prediction markets à la the Policy Analysis Market will not reveal brilliant insights about terrorist intentions; they won't provide tactical initiative but may prevent strategic surprise. The final, probabilistic prices of the various contracts can act as a signal for strategic leaders about where intelligence efforts should be more focused.
The professed Congressional unease that the original PAM would allow people to profit by a market in death and destruction is myopic and nonsensical. Such a market has existed for hundreds of years -it's called the insurance industry. Every day, insurance companies earn money by predicting who will die and when, and what kind of disaster might strike.
A similar logic can be applied to the concern that terrorists might profit in an intelligence prediction market by using their tacit knowledge. Paying money to unsavory characters in exchange for intelligence is nothing new; the Sanhedrin paid Judas Iscariot thirty pieces of silver
